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ABSTRACT
In the current Internet, there is no clean way for affected par-
ties to react to poor forwarding performance: to detect and
assess Service Level Agreement (SLA) violations by a con-
tractual partner, a domain must resort to ad-hoc monitoring
using probes. Instead, we propose Network Confessional,
a new, systematic approach to the problem of forwarding-
performance verification. Our system relies on voluntary re-
porting, allowing each network domain to disclose its loss
and delay performance to its customers and peers and, po-
tentially, a regulator. Most importantly, it enables verifiable
performance measurements, i.e., domains cannot abuse it to
significantly exaggerate their performance. Finally, our sys-
tem is tunable, allowing each participating domain to deter-
mine how many resources to devote to it independently (i.e.,
without any inter-domain coordination), exposing a con-
trollable trade-off between performance-verification
quality and resource consumption. Our system comes at the
cost of deploying modest functionality at the participating
domains’ border routers; we show that it requires reasonable
resources, well within modern network capabilities.
1. INTRODUCTION
The lack of a systematic method for estimating the perfor-
mance of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) is a well known
problem: when an ISP does not perform as expected, there
is no clean way for the affected parties to detect the prob-
lem so they can debug it, ask for compensation if a Service-
Level Agreement (SLA) has been violated, or simply learn
from it (e.g., re-assess a peering agreement with an under-
performing neighbor). This lack of information makes net-
work debugging difficult and slow, even leading ISPs to deny
their failures to their customers and peers, pointing fingers
at one another. One could attribute this situation to the best-
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effort nature of the Internet which, by definition, provides
no a-priori guarantees. Yet that is no reason not to expect
useful, after-the-fact information about ISP performance—
actually, it makes perfect sense to expect such information
in a best-effort environment like the Internet, where commu-
nication quality often relies on quick failure detection and
on choosing the right providers and peers.
Since ISPs offer no explicit interface for their customers
and peers to verify their performance, the latter can only
resort to probing tools like traceroute or other active mea-
surements. Moreover, researchers have recently started to
combine probing from multiple vantage points (e.g., Planet-
Lab nodes) to gain information about ISP performance that
would not be accessible through simple probing [15, 16].
This information is typically extracted from channels with a
different purpose (e.g., ICMP traffic), because probing mech-
anisms are designed under the assumption that ISPs would
never freely provide honest information about their perfor-
mance.
But what if an ISP is required, e.g., by government regu-
lation, to expose information on how it treats different traffic
flows? The UK telecommunications regulator already took
a first step in 2009 by publicly disclosing information on
ISP performance [4], and there is ongoing debate regard-
ing the extent to which ISPs’ traffic handling should be reg-
ulated [5]. Yet experience says that, once ISPs know that
their performance is being measured in a certain way, they
find ways to game the measurement process. Hence, we be-
lieve that this is the right time to discuss the design and im-
plementation of an interface through which an ISP can pro-
vide accurate and verifiable information on its performance,
while consuming a reasonable, tunable amount of resources
for this purpose.
Moreover, given an either-or choice, an ISP may prefer
to expose information on its performance itself, rather than
have its performance evaluated by untrusted entities, through
potentially inaccurate mechanisms. Probing or other edge-
based “black-box” mechanisms typically run on coalitions
of end systems like PlanetLab; the ISP has no reason to
trust these, and they can provide no guarantee for the ac-
curacy of their measurements. If an ISP’s performance is to
be talked about anyway, an accurate, trusted self-reporting
system may be preferable to the ISP, because, at least, it pro-
vides the ISP with control over the quality and quantity of
the information that is revealed about its business.
Finally, ISPs often need to exchange performance infor-
mation anyway with their customers and peers, in order to
handle customer complaints. When a customer calls her ISP
to complain that she cannot reach a certain destination, the
ISP needs to know whether the problem lies in its own local
network, the customer’s network, the network of the peer
that is handling traffic to that destination, or the destina-
tion’s network—because each of these cases warrants a dif-
ferent response. Today, this information is acquired by ISP
operators in a reactive, ad-hoc manner, which means that it
takes time to resolve each complaint, potentially leaving cus-
tomers dissatisfied. It makes sense that an ISP would prefer
to collaborate with its customers and peers and willingly ex-
change troubleshooting reports with them, provided that it
can trust these reports to be accurate and honest.
In the rest of the paper, we describe Network Confessional,
a protocol that enables verifiable network-performance mea-
surements. Each ISP that runs this protocol produces traffic
receipts on sampled packets at its entry and exit points (i.e.,
border routers), exchanges these with the other networks that
observe its traffic, and, potentially, makes them available to
a verifier such as a regulator. These receipts are specially
crafted, so that: (1) they enable accurate estimation of ISP
performance, without revealing any information about the
internal structure or routing policies of ISPs beyond what
is already publicly available through BGP routing tables; (2)
ISPs cannot produce fake receipts to significantly exaggerate
their performance; and (3) each ISP can choose how many
resources to devote to receipt generation independently from
others, yet in a way that does not compromise the verifiabil-
ity of the derived measurements. These features come at the
cost of deploying new functionality at the participating do-
mains’ border routers, but we show that that requires reason-
able resources and readily available hardware (we describe
one implementation that requires 10 MB of SRAM and a
TCAM chip of 1 MB per router linecard).
We start, in Section 2, with our problem statement, threat
model, and assumptions. Then we explain, in Section 3, why
straightforward extensions of existing techniques fail to pro-
vide an adequate solution. We describe Network Confes-
sional in two parts: first, under certain simplifying assump-
tions in Section 4, then without these assumptions in Sec-
tion 5. We describe an implementation in Section 6 and ex-
perimentally evaluate the quality of information it provides
in Section 7. We discuss related work in Section 8 and con-
clude in Section 9.
2. SETUP
Informally, we want to design a measurement protocol
such that (1) domains can accurately estimate the perfor-
mance of their neighbors, (2) domains cannot bias the mea-
surement process to their advantage without being detected,
and (3) they need a reasonable, tunable amount of resources
to collect and exchange the measurements.
Figure 1: Circles represent administrative domains. The
numbered boxes represent border routers.
2.1 Terminology
A domain is a contiguous network that falls under one ad-
ministrative entity; in the current Internet, a domain would
refer to an edge network or a single Autonomous System
(AS). A path is a sequence of nodes, where each node corre-
sponds to a border router of a domain, and the first and last
node belong to edge domains (Fig. 1).
With respect to a specific path, a node can be either an
input node (the even-numbered nodes in Fig. 1) or an out-
put node (the odd-numbered nodes in Fig. 1). Two consec-
utive nodes are peering, if they belong to adjacent domains
(e.g., nodes 1 and 2, or 3 and 4 in Fig. 1). The link between
two peering nodes i and j is faulty, if it introduces packet
loss, or reordering, or delay beyond a value ∆ij that is pre-
negotiated between the two nodes (e.g., is characteristic of
the link technology between them).
A packet stream observed at node i is a time series, where
each element corresponds to a packet and the time at which
the packet was observed at node i.
2.2 Problem Statement
We consider a set of paths. Each packet is associated with
a specific path k, i.e., it is forwarded along path k until it
reaches the last node on k or it is dropped.
Each node i on path k observes a packet stream P ki . Each
node j that comes after i on path k, observes a packet stream
P kj = T
k
ij (P
k
i ), where T kij denotes transformation and may
be any combination of packet loss, delay and reordering (but
may not involve packet injection or modification). I.e., the
packets in P kj are always a subset of the packets in P ki , and
two packets may appear with a different order in the two
packet streams. Given an input node i and an output node j
that comes after i on path k, we denote by λkij the amount
of packet loss experienced by path-k traffic between nodes
i and j; we denote by δkij(q) the q-th quantile of the delay
experienced by path-k traffic between i and j—for instance,
if δkij(95) = 10 msec, this means that 95% of the packets
from path k that traverse nodes i and j, experience delay
below 10 msec between i and j.
All the nodes on each path k participate in a measure-
ment protocol, according to which, each node i that observes
packet stream P ki , computes a set of receipts,Rki = Fr(P ki ).
All receipts generated by all nodes on path k are correctly
delivered to a set of receipt collectors, which compute a set
of functions on them. The receipt collectors may include any
of the domains that observe traffic from path k and/or a reg-
ulator. Each receipt collector can compute three functions:
1. For each pair of an input node i and output node j that
comes after i on path k, a loss function Fλ(Rki , Rkj ),
which returns an estimate of the packet loss λkij , and a
delay-quantile function Fδ(Rki , Rkj , q), which returns
an estimate of the delay quantile δkij(q).
2. For each pair of peering nodes i and j on path k, a
verification functionFv(Rki , Rkj ), which returns “true”
or “false.” “True” indicates that the peering nodes are
functioning (including running the protocol) correctly.
Our threat model is as follows. Node i is honest with
respect to path k, if it computes Rki using the specified Fr.
Node i is lying with respect to path k, if it computes at least
one receipt in Rki using an arbitrary Fˆr. Lying nodes can
collude and choose their Fˆr in coordination. A domain is
honest with respect to path k, if both of its nodes are honest
with respect to k, otherwise it is lying.
We want to design a measurement protocol (i.e., specify
functions Fr Fλ, Fδ and Fv), such that the following con-
ditions are met:
1. If input node i and output node j on path k are honest
with respect to k, then |λkij − Fλ(Rki , Rkj )| < lkij and
|δkij(q) − Fδ(R
k
i , R
k
j , q)| < d
k
ij with probability pikij .
The error margins, lkij and dkij , and the probability with
which they are honored, pikij , depend on (and can be
computed from) node i’s and node j’s configuration—
in particular the amount of memory and computing cy-
cles used by the two nodes to run the protocol.
2. If peering nodes i and j on path k are honest with re-
spect to k, and the inter-domain link between them is
not faulty, Fv(Rki , Rkj ) is “true,” otherwise it is “false.”
3. Computing Rki for all paths k in which node i partici-
pates does not require that i maintain per-packet, per-
flow, or per-path state.
Given that packet streams may be infinite or arbitrarily
long, the receipt collectors should be able to compute their
functions, and the above properties should hold over fixed
time intervals. All symbols mentioned above are summa-
rized in Table 1. For brevity, when it is obvious from the
context that we are referring to a particular path, we drop the
superscript k from P ki , Rki , λkij , and δkij .
Discussion. The first condition ensures that a receipt col-
lector can estimate the performance of honest domains with
probabilistic guarantees. It also ensures that collusion comes
at a cost: two adjacent domains are free to collude such that
a receipt collector cannot accurately estimate their perfor-
mance; but, if they do that, one of them will appear to have
better performance at the expense of the other. For instance,
consider the path depicted in Fig. 1. Suppose that domain
X introduces loss λ45, while domain N introduces loss λ67.
Suppose that node 5 is lying, such that Fλ(R4, R5) = λ45−
Λ, where Λ  0 (i.e., from X’s receipts, it looks like its
packet loss is significantly lower than it actually is). Finally,
suppose that node 6 is also lying, such that Fv(R5, R6) =
“true” (i.e., domain N covers X’s lie). According to the first
condition, as long as nodes 4 and 7 are honest,Fλ(R4, R7) ≈
λ47; given that packet loss is additive, this necessarily means
that Fλ(R6, R7) ≈ λ67 +Λ, i.e., from N ’s receipts, it looks
like its packet loss is significantly higher than it actually is.
The second condition ensures that, if a domain deviates
from the protocol, it necessarily implicates one of its neigh-
bors and is exposed to that neighbor as a liar. For instance,
suppose that node 5 in Fig. 1 is lying (e.g., to hide the fact
that X is dropping packets). If node 6 is honest, that will
cause Fv(R5, R6) to return “false,” alerting the receipt col-
lector that either 5 or 6 is lying, or the link between them
is faulty. In general, a receipt collector cannot know which
of these is true, but domain N can: it can debug the inter-
domain link, determine that it is functioning correctly, and
conclude that X is lying and is implicating N in its lie.
The third condition—no per-packet, per-flow or per-path
state—is important, because a node may observe hundreds
of thousands, perhaps even millions of concurrent flows and
paths.
2.3 Assumptions
We make the following assumptions:
(1) There exists a way for a domain to disseminate re-
ceipts to any other domain, such that the authenticity and
integrity of each received receipt is guaranteed. One way of
realizing this assumption would be for each domain to make
its receipts available at an administrative web-site and ac-
cessible over HTTPS. It is possible to design more efficient
dissemination mechanisms, but that is outside the scope of
this paper.
(2) Each domain has some network equipment (routers or
other middleboxes) that can perform at wire speed simple
per-packet operations. Those include packet timestamp gen-
eration, arithmetic calculations or digest computations on a
small, fixed portion of a packet, and modification of local
state in a buffer. This assumption is in line with current
trends in production routers, as well as the increasing fo-
cus of academia and industry on programmable routers and
switches [10, 19].
(3) Nodes (whether honest or lying) do not apply any trans-
formation to the observed packet stream other than packet
loss, delay, or reordering. In particular, they do not inject
new packets or modify observed packets. To the best of
our knowledge, packet injection and modification is further
from current ISP practices (than introducing loss or unpre-
dictable delay and denying performance problems), and we
defer dealing with this behavior to future work.
3. WHY A NEW PROTOCOL
There already exist many good techniques for measuring
network performance [11,14,17,22]. So, instead of describ-
ing our protocol from scratch, we first build, in this section,
“obvious” solutions by extending existing techniques, and
explain why these do not meet the conditions of our prob-
lem statement. We close with a brief overview of Network
Confessional.
Packet Obituaries+. As a first-cut solution, we consider
the following modest extension to the Packet Obituaries pro-
tocol [6]. Fr produces a receipt for every observed packet,
which consists of a digest for the corresponding packet and
the timestamp for when the packet was observed. Fλ(Rki , Rkj )
and Fδ(Rki , Rkj , q) are straightforward—the former counts
how many packets from path k were observed at node i ver-
sus node j, while the latter relies on comparing the times-
tamps recorded for the same packet at node i versus node j.
Fv(R
k
i , R
k
j ) returns “false” if there exists at least one packet
from path k such that: i produced a receipt for it but j did
not, or the difference in the two timestamps recorded for this
packet at nodes i and j exceeds a value ∆ij pre-negotiated
between the two nodes.
This protocol fails to meet our third condition: it requires
storing, processing, and disseminating per-packet receipts,
leaving no room to a participating domain to choose (and
tune, according to network conditions) the amount of re-
sources it devotes to reporting its performance.
Coordinated Trajectory Sampling. Since the fundamen-
tal problem with Packet Obituaries+ is maintaining per-packet
state, the first solution that comes to mind is to sample, i.e.,
produce receipts not on all packets, but on a representative
subset, and use them to infer statistics for the rest. Hence, we
first consider a simple combination of Packet Obituaries and
Trajectory Sampling [11] (POTS, for brevity): Fr applies a
uniform hash function to a small, fixed portion of each ob-
served packet; if the outcome is equal to a pre-configured
value, then the packet is sampled and a receipt is produced
for it (note that, since all nodes use the same sampling func-
tion, they all sample the same packets). Fλ and Fδ can be
any functions that estimate the loss and delay experienced
by all packets, based on the loss and delay experienced by
a representative subset of sampled packets [22]. Fv is the
same as in Packet Obituaries+.
This protocol fails to meet our first condition: it is possible
that all nodes are honest (i.e., run the protocol as specified),
yet Fλ and Fδ return arbitrarily inaccurate results. In par-
ticular, each input node can engage in the following behav-
ior: for each observed packet, runFr, determine whether the
packet should be sampled and, if yes, treat the packet pref-
erentially, e.g., assign it to a high-priority queue. I.e., the
nodes bias the sampling process, such that they tell the truth
about what happens to the sampled packets, but that is not
representative of what happens to the rest of the traffic.
Symbol Meaning
P ki Packet stream observed at node i and associated with
path k.
T kij Function that defines transformation of path-k traffic
between nodes i and j.
λkij Packet loss experienced by path-k traffic between
nodes i and j.
δkij(q) q-th quantile of delay experienced by path-k traffic
between nodes i and j.
Rki Receipts for path-k traffic produced by node i.
Fr Function used by honest nodes to compute receipts.
Fλ Function used by receipt collector to compute estimate
of loss rate between two nodes.
Fδ Function used by receipt collector to compute estimate
of delay quantile between two nodes.
Fv Function used by receipt collector to verify whether
peering nodes are running the protocol correctly.
lkij Maximum estimation error incurred by receipt collector
when estimating λkij from i and j’s receipts.
dkij Maximum estimation error incurred by receipt collector
when estimating δkij(q) from i and j’s receipts.
pikij Probability with which lkij and dkij are honored.
Table 1: Defined symbols.
Note that, even if we modify POTS so that domains sam-
ple non-overlapping subsets of packets, domains can col-
lude, such that all of them treat all subsets of sampled pack-
ets preferentially. In this way, all nodes tell the truth, yet Fλ
and Fδ return arbitrarily inaccurate results.
Verifiable Aggregation. An alternative to sampling is ag-
gregation: instead of producing receipts for sampled pack-
ets, produce receipts for packet aggregates. We could design
such an alternative by combining Packet Obituaries with ei-
ther the Lossy Difference Aggregator [17] or the “Secure
Sketch” technique [14]. We have explored that alternative
extensively elsewhere [8]. To summarize, these combina-
tions fail to meet our first condition, because they do not
provide a delay-quantile function Fδ (only statistics on av-
erage delay). Most importantly, they do not meet our third
condition, because computing their Fr requires maintaining
per-path state.
Our Solution. We employ sampling, but in a way that is
not susceptible to bias. Our solution shares elements with
Trajectory Sampling (nodes produce receipts for a subset of
observed packets and choose which packets to sample using
hash functions), but prevents sampling bias in the following
way: the sampling function is keyed on future traffic, mak-
ing the samples unpredictable. Specifically, a domain does
not know whether it will have to report measurements on a
particular packet until after it has forwarded that packet to
its downstream neighbor. As a result, an unscrupulous do-
main has no way to decide whether to “sugarcoat” its per-
formance by preferentially treating particular packets. The
challenge is implementing this idea in a practical manner,
i.e., without requiring the source to explicitly signal to all
the other nodes which packets to sample, in accordance to
the resource requirements dictated by our third condition,
and with per-domain tunability.
4. BASIC OPERATION
We now describe the basic elements of Network Confes-
sional. For simplicity, we assume, in this section, that all
nodes have synchronized clocks and that there is no ambigu-
ity regarding the path followed by a packet (i.e., when a node
observes a packet, it knows which path this packet is associ-
ated with). We relax these assumptions in the next section.
4.1 Receipt Generation
Each node samples a subset of the packets it observes and
generates a receipt for each sampled packet; each receipt is
made available to all nodes on the path of the correspond-
ing packet and, potentially, a verifier such as a regulator.
A receipt has form R = 〈ReporterID , ReporterConfig ,
PacketID ,Time,NeighborID ,∆〉. ReporterID is the iden-
tity of the reporting node and ReporterConfig a specifica-
tion of its sampling function (more on this later). PacketID
is a digest of the packet’s headers and a small portion of
its content. Time specifies when the packet was observed.
NeighborID is the identity of the node that is peering with
the reporter on the path where the packet belongs. ∆ is a
value agreed upon between the reporter and the neighbor;
it is meant to upper-bound the difference in timestamps one
should expect between the two nodes.
Instead of sampling packets in real time, each node col-
lects state on all observed packets, but only for a fixed, short
period of time (tens of milliseconds). The node is periodi-
cally told which of the stored per-packet state to keep and
which to discard. Since a domain learns whether a packet’s
fate will affect estimates of its performance only after it has
forwarded that packet, it cannot treat sampled packets pref-
erentially.
A key question is who tells each node which packets to
sample. One approach would be to use explicit signaling; for
example, in Fig. 1, domain S could explicitly tell all nodes
which packets to sample from the packet stream sent from S
to D, as in the PAAI-1 packet-dropping adversary identifi-
cation protocol [23]. In our context, however, that approach
would be naı¨ve, because it would require each source do-
main to actively probe all Internet paths through which it
sends traffic Instead, each node decides whether to sample
a packet based on the contents of another packet observed
later. In this sense, domain S implicitly dictates which of its
packets should be sampled, through the traffic it sends out
subsequently.
More specifically, each node maintains a circular buffer,
where it stores a tuple (path ID, packet ID, and timestamp)
for the β most recently observed packets. Alg. 1 shows what
happens when a node observes a new packet p. First, the
node computes a tuple Tp for the new packet (line 1). Then,
if the packet satisfies a certain condition, it is chosen as a
“marker” packet (line 2). In that case, its contents determine
which of the β most recently observed packets to sample
(lines 3–5); only packets from the same path with the marker
packet can be sampled (line 4). The tuples of the chosen
Algorithm 1 ProcessPacket(packet p)
PathID(packet) packet’s path
PacketID(packet) hash function
MarkerID(packet) hash function
Hash(packet1, packet2) hash function
µ marking threshold
σ sampling threshold
Buffer circular buffer
Initially Buffer ← ∅
1: Tp ← 〈PathID(p),PacketID(p),Time〉
2: if MarkerID(p) < µ then
3: for all T in Buffer do
4: if T.PathID = Tp.PathID then
5: if Hash(T.PacketID , Tp.PacketID) < σ then
6: Copy T for dissemination
7: Remove T from Buffer
8: Copy Tp for dissemination
9: else
10: Add Tp to Buffer
packets are copied for later dissemination (line 6). All tu-
ples that correspond to packets from the same path with the
marker are removed from the buffer (line 7). The marker
packet itself is also sampled (line 8). If the new packet is not
chosen as a marker, its tuple is added to the circular buffer
(lines 9, 10).
The parameters of the algorithm are: the size of the cir-
cular buffer β, the marking threshold µ, which determines
which packets are markers (line 2), and the sampling thresh-
old σ, which determines which of the tuples in the circular
buffer to sample (line 5). Moreover, MarkerID(p) is a func-
tion that provides uniform hashing between 0 and some max-
imum valueM, while Hash (PacketID(p1), PacketID(p2))
provides uniform hashing between 0 and some maximum
value S .
Lemma 4.1. Suppose that each packet observed by a node
belongs to a path k with probability α. If the node uses
Alg. 1, it samples each packet from path k with probability
pis =
(
1−
(
1−
αµ
M
)β)
·
σ
S
(1)
PROOF. An observed packet p is sampled when: (1) p’s
tuple is still in the circular buffer when the next marker m
from the same path arrives and (2) Hash (PacketID(p),
PacketID(m)) < σ. We first compute the probability of
event (1). Consider an observed packet p that is not chosen
as a marker. Each of the packets observed after p is from the
same path with p and is chosen as a marker with probabil-
ity αµ
M
. Hence, the number of packets observed between p
and m (we call it the “distance” between p and m) is a ran-
dom variable with geometric distribution and success rate
αµ
M
. It follows that the probability that Distance(p,m) < β
is equal to the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the
geometric distribution, i.e., 1 −
(
1− αµ
M
)β
. Next, we com-
pute the probability of event (2) given event (1). Given that
p’s tuple is still in the circular buffer when m arrives, p is
sampled with probability σ
S
. Hence, packet p is sampled
with probability
(
1−
(
1− αµ
M
)β)
· σ
S
.
Eq. 1 says that, as long as β  M
αµ
, then pis ≈ σS , i.e., a
node samples each observed packet p with the same proba-
bility σ
S
, independently from which path p is associated with,
and independently from the size of the circular buffer β. In-
tuitively, as long as the circular buffer is large enough that a
packet p’s tuple is always in the buffer when the next marker
from the same path with p is observed, then the size of the
circular buffer β does not affect which packets are sampled.
For the rest of this section, we will assume that this is the
case. In practice, each node chooses its β such that β  M
αµ
for α ≥ 0.001, i.e., as long as traffic from a certain path ex-
ceeds 0.1% of the overall traffic observed at the node, then
the node samples each packet from that path with the same
probability σ
S
.
The marking threshold µ is a system-wide constant, com-
mon for all nodes; hence, all nodes on a certain path select
the same packets as marker packets for that path (modulo
loss). In contrast, the sampling threshold σ is a local pa-
rameter, chosen independently at each node. If all nodes on
a certain path choose the same σ, they all sample the same
packets from that path (modulo loss and reordering). We
turn next to what happens when different nodes select differ-
ent σ.
4.2 Tunability
Each node chooses its own sampling threshold σ. At the
same time, given any number of nodes and their sampling
thresholds, we maximize the number of packets that are com-
monly sampled by all nodes on the same path. The key el-
ement that enables this property is the inequality in line 5
of Alg. 1. Consider nodes 1 and 2, with different sampling
thresholds σ1 and σ2 > σ1. Suppose there is no packet loss
or reordering between the two nodes; p is a packet sampled
by node 1, and m is the first marker from the same path with
p, observed after p. Since node 1 samples p, this necessarily
means thatHash(PacketID(p),PacketID(m))< σ1 < σ2,
which means that node 2 also samples p.
So, even though each node chooses its sampling thresh-
old σ independently, if there is no packet loss or reordering
between two nodes on the same path, the node with bigger
σ will sample at least all the packets from that path sampled
by the node with smaller σ.
4.3 Receipt-based Statistics
We now consider a receipt collector that collects receipts
from the nodes in Fig. 1 and describe how it computes and
verifies the performance of domain X .
Loss Function. For brevity, we define λ = λ45. For
simplicity, we first assume that there is no packet reorder-
ing within domain X , i.e., packets that are not lost between
nodes 4 and 5 are observed at the two nodes in the same
order. We will remove this assumption later.
The receipt collector considers the receipts R4 and R5
generated by the two nodes during a given time period. By
looking at the ReporterConfig values of these receipts, it di-
vides the time period into sub-periods, such that, throughout
each sub-period, each node used a constant sampling thresh-
old. For each sub-period, it counts the number of packets
K that were sampled by node 4 and should have been sam-
pled by both nodes, i.e., all packets p that: (1) were sampled
by node 4 based on a marker m that was also observed at
node 5 and (2) satisfy Hash(PacketID(p), PacketID(m))
< σmin , where σmin is the smaller sampling threshold used
by the two nodes. Of these K packets, it counts the number
of packets k that were not sampled by node 5 and estimates
the loss rate λ between the two nodes as Fλ(R4, R5) = kK .
Now assume that there is some packet reordering between
the two nodes. As above, the receipt collector first counts
the number of packets K that were sampled by node 4 and
should have been sampled by both nodes and, of these, the
number of packets k that were not sampled by node 5. Of
these k packets, let’s say that kl were lost between nodes 4
and 5, while kr = k− kl were reordered with their previous
or next marker such that node 5 did observe them but did
not sample them. Hence, to accurately estimate the loss rate
between the two nodes (as kl
K
), the receipt collector would
need to know kl or kr.
Fortunately, there is a simple way around this problem.
Packet reordering caused node 5 not to sample kr packets
that it would have sampled otherwise, but it also caused node
5 to sample k¯r packets that it would not have sampled, had
there been no reordering. Assuming that the probability of
two packets being reordered depends only on the distance
between them [12], then kr and k¯r should be statistically the
same. The receipt collector does not know kr (it is masked
by the kl packets that were lost between the two nodes), but
it does know k¯r; it is the number of packets p that: (1) were
not sampled by node 4, (2) were sampled by node 5 based
on a marker m that was also observed at node 4, and (3) sat-
isfy Hash(PacketID(p),PacketID(m)) < σmin . Hence,
the receipt collector computes k¯r and estimates the loss rate
between the two nodes as Fλ(R4, R5) = k−k¯rK , i.e., it ap-
proximates kr with k¯r.
Lemma 4.2. The expected value of the estimate is λ. The
relative standard deviation is√
1− λ
N pis λ
+
2 pir(1− pir)
N pis λ2
(2)
where all the parameters are specified in Table 2.
PROOF. In our technical report [8].
Parameter Meaning
λ Actual loss rate (that we are trying to estimate).
N Number of packets observed at node 4 during the
given sub-period before a marker m that was also
observed at node 5.
pis Probability that a packet is sampled, given by Eq. 1.
pir Probability that a packet is reordered with its marker
and observed at node 5 but not sampled by it.
Table 2: Parameters for Lemma 4.2.
Once we know the standard deviation of the estimate, it is
straightforward to compute its maximum distance from the
actual loss with a given probability pi [21].
Lemma 4.2 tells us that packet reordering does not prevent
us from estimating λ correctly, however, it does increase the
relative standard deviation of our estimate. The relative stan-
dard deviation depends on the average number of sampled
packets that we use to produce the estimate (N pis in Eq. 2):
the better (lower) the relative standard deviation that we want
to achieve, the more samples (receipts on sampled packets)
we need to collect. To give some concrete numbers, sup-
pose that λ = 5%, and we want to estimate it with a relative
standard deviation of 0.1. According to Eq. 2, if there is no
packet reordering (pir = 0), we can produce a new estimate
every time we have collected receipts on N pis = 1900 new
packets; if there is packet reordering, such that pir = 10%
of the packets that should be sampled by node 5 miss their
marker and are not sampled, then we can produce an esti-
mate every time we have collected receipts on N pis = 9100
new packets. Assuming a traffic rate of 100 Mbps, a sam-
pling rate of pis = 1%, and about 400 bytes/packet, 1900
sampled packets correspond to 7 seconds, while 9100 pack-
ets correspond to 30 seconds. So, packet reordering forces
us to estimate loss rate at longer intervals in order to achieve
a given level of accuracy.
Delay-Quantile Function. The receipt collector consid-
ers all the receipts generated by nodes 4 and 5 during a given
time period. By looking at the PacketID of these receipts, it
determines the set of packets that were commonly sampled
by the two nodes. By comparing the Time reported by the
two nodes for each commonly sampled packet, it computes
the delay incurred by the packet within X . Finally, by com-
bining the delay incurred by multiple packets, it estimates
the maximum delay incurred by q% of the packets, by us-
ing the algorithm proposed in [22]. That algorithm takes as
input (1) the delays incurred by all sampled packets, (2) the
quantile q we are interested in, and (3) a probability pi, and
outputs a lower and upper bound, such that the actual delay
value we are estimating falls between the two bounds with
probability pi.
Verification Function. The receipt collector considers all
the receipts generated by each pair of peering nodes i and
j during a given time period. Then it identifies the set of
packets that were sampled by node i and should have been
sampled by both nodes (we explained how this is achieved in
the “Loss Function” paragraph above). Fv(Ri, Rj) returns
“true” when all of the following hold for all packets p that
belong to this set: (1) Either both nodes i and j or none
of them provide a receipt on p. (2) If both nodes provide
receipts on p (say, Ri(p) and Rj(p)), then:
Ri(p).∆ = Rj(p).∆
Ri(p).Time −Rj(p).Time ≤ Rj(p).∆
These rules express the fact that a correct inter-domain link
does not introduce loss or unpredictable delay.
In Section 2.2, we stated that we wanted functionFv(Ri, Rj)
to return “true,” if both nodes i and j run the protocol cor-
rectly and the link between them is not faulty, otherwise, it
should return “false.” Network Confessional meets this con-
dition when nodes i and j use the same sampling threshold.
However, if node i is expected to sample more packets than
node j (because it uses a larger sampling threshold), then
node i is free to lie about the packets that should be sampled
by i but not by j. This means that the receipt collector can
verify X’s performance, only based on the packets that are
expected to be commonly sampled by X and its neighbors.
4.4 Adversarial Conditions
Network Confessional tries to (1) maximize the number
of packets commonly sampled by all nodes and (2) prevent
nodes from biasing their sampling. We now look at how it
reacts when node behavior undermines these two goals.
Deliberate Marker Loss. An under-performing domain
(say X in Fig. 1) may drop all marker packets, causing the
next domain (N , in our example) to not sample any packets,
in order to ensure that X’s performance is never verified ac-
cording to N ’s receipts or simply to make N look bad. Such
behavior is necessarily exposed, because all marker packets
must be sampled. If X drops a marker m, it either has to
admit dropping it, or lie and be inconsistent with N ’s report
that it never received m. So, if X consistently drops marker
packets, it either admits it and is globally exposed as under-
performing and misbehaving, or blames the losses on N and
is exposed to N as a liar.
Delayed Forwarding. A dishonest domain may store ev-
ery packet, wait to learn whether the packet has to be sam-
pled, then decide how to treat the packet. Such behavior can
be beneficial, when the domain has multiple internal paths
whose latencies vary by tens of milliseconds. However, to
game the system in this way, a domain needs to equip its
border routers with the capability to temporarily store entire
packets (not just their tuples) and index/forward these pack-
ets at line rate as the corresponding marker packets arrive;
hence, the domain would have to pay a router manufacturer
to equip the domain’s border routers with hardware designed
especially for nefarious goals. We consider this case in our
technical report, where we show how to configure Network
Confessional such that, by delayed forwarding, a domain
makes its own performance appear worse than real (because
it is forced to wait too long to learn whether a packet has to
be sampled, in order to game the system) [8].
Packet Crafting. Network Confessional was not designed
to resist attacks where domains deliberately inject or modify
packets (Section 2), however, we do discuss what happens
when it encounters such behavior. Suppose domain X mod-
ifies an observed packet p or, equivalently, drops p and in-
troduces a new packet q in its place. Let’s first assume that q
has a different packet ID from p. There are several cases: (1)
p is sampled, in which case node 4 produces a receipt on p,
but node 5 does not, hence X appears to have dropped p. (2)
q is sampled, in which case X appears to have introduced
a new packet. (3) Neither packet is sampled, in which case
X’s behavior does not impact its receipts. So, it is possible
for X to modify a few packets and get away with it. How-
ever, if it consistently engages in such behavior, given that it
cannot predict which packets will be sampled, it will even-
tually have to report on one of the modified packets, and its
behavior will be exposed. On the other hand, if X can craft q
such that it has the same packet ID with p, then its behavior
does not impact its receipts at all. We believe that we can de-
fend against such attacks by making it hard to craft packets
with a given packet ID, but we defer this to future work.
5. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
We now relax the assumptions made in Section 4—that
all nodes must have perfectly synchronized clocks and that
there is no ambiguity regarding the path followed by each
observed packet.
Clock Synchronization. Network Confessional does not
dictate any particular clock-synchronization policy. How-
ever, it is to each participating domain’s best interest to keep
its reporting nodes (its border routers) reasonably synchro-
nized, since the domain’s delay performance will be esti-
mated based on the timestamps reported by these nodes. More-
over, it is to two neighboring domains’ best interest to keep
peering nodes reasonably synchronized, otherwise their times-
tamp difference will exceed the reported ∆, and the two
neighbors will generate inconsistent reports (hence appear
to have a problematic inter-domain link or be involved in a
lie). We should clarify that domains are free to report arbi-
trarily large ∆ values: nothing prevents nodes 3 and 4 from
reporting a ∆ of seconds between them, hence not needing
to synchronize their clocks beyond that granularity. How-
ever, that does make it look like they are connected through
an awfully slow inter-domain link—not a good feature to ad-
vertise to their customers and peers.
So, what is a reasonable granularity at which a domain
should keep its border routers synchronized? Since typical
intra-domain latency is on the order of tens of milliseconds, a
granularity of a millisecond is sufficient. This is reportedly
achievable with NTP [9]. But if NTP is not deemed suffi-
ciently reliable, a domain can equip its border routers with
radio or GPS receivers [2], currently costing $200 a piece—a
negligible cost compared to that of a border router.
Mapping Packets to Paths. In reality, a node cannot
know the path followed by each observed packet, so it clas-
sifies packets per {source prefix, destination prefix} pair,
where “prefix” is the origin prefix of the corresponding IP
address as obtained through BGP, such that all domains that
observe a packet p derive the same prefix pair for the packet.
This has no implication for us when all packets with the
same source and destination prefix follow the same path;
otherwise, it requires a straightforward extension [8]. We
should clarify that this extension is not needed by domains
that apply the common types of load-balancing. For in-
stance, domains can load-balance traffic per destination pre-
fix or source/destination prefix across multiple inter-domain
paths without the extension. It is only needed by domains
that load-balance traffic with the same source and destina-
tion prefix across different inter-domain paths; we are not
aware of ISPs engaging in such load-balancing, but there is
no way to verify that they do not.
Privacy. We will now argue informally that external ob-
servers can see no more internal information about a domain
with Network Confessional than they can see today without
it. We acknowledge that privacy deserves a fuller, formal
analysis, but defer that to future work.
First, we consider the “privacy perimeter” lying around
a single participating domain, i.e., consider whether Net-
work Confessional exposes to the outside world any infor-
mation that was previously exclusively known to the domain.
Our privacy argument is based on the content of traffic re-
ceipts. The two receipt fields directly dependent on traffic
are PacketID and Time, both of which can be filled in by
the domain’s neighbor transmitting packets to or receiving
packets from the domain. ReporterID , NeighborID , and
∆ are already known to the corresponding neighbors, hence
leak no information that was previously exclusively known
to the domain.
Next, we consider the privacy perimeter lying around a
pair of neighboring domains. As described in Section 4.1,
traffic receipts do reveal some information that would oth-
erwise remain private between the two neighbors: the num-
ber of peering points (as exposed via distinct ReporterID’s
and NeighborID’s), as well as the expected delay imposed
by the inter-domain links (as exposed via ∆). However, in
practice, two neighbors can easily conceal both types of in-
formation from outsiders. First, they can conceal the number
of peering points by using a single pair of ReporterID and
NeighborID in traffic receipts. They can also conceal the
actual delay of links in a similar fashion, as follows. They
can agree to “absorb” the latency of the inter-domain link
into their own intra-domain latencies. For instance, consider
nodes 5 and 6 from Fig. 1 and assume the latency of the link
between them is 1 msec. Instead of reporting ∆ = 1 msec,
the two nodes report ∆ ≈ 0. When node 5 observes packet
p at time t1, it reports observing it at time t1 + 0.5 msec;
similarly, when node 6 observes packet p at time t2, it re-
ports observing it at time t2 − 0.5 msec. In this way, the
latency of the inter-domain link is hidden from the outside
world and “charged” equally to the two domains. Note that
this does not affect in any way the capability of Network
Confessional to detect and expose lies.
Partial Deployment. Partial deployment is still beneficial
to the participating domains. Even if X is the only domain
on a certain path that has deployed Network Confessional,
its performance reports may not be verified by its neigh-
bors, but they are still verifiable. So, during a congestion
incident, X can still position itself as the “good” ISP that
provides troubleshooting information to its customers—it is
not its fault that the other ISPs on the path are not up to
the task. X can even use this as an incentive to encour-
age multi-network customers to connect all their networks
through X—since that way they avoid domains that do not
provide troubleshooting information.
Incentives. If domain X has not deployed Network Con-
fessional, but its neighbors have, then X’s neighbors are
free to blame their performance problems on X (since X
does not produce any receipts to refute their claims). Conse-
quently, the fault localization properties of Network Confes-
sional are provided only at the granularity of deployment—
informally, the sub-graph of the domain topology whose ver-
tices are participating domains and whose edges link par-
ticipating domains only over domain paths that include no
participating domain in the topology. On the other hand,
the loss of fault-localization resolution due to partial deploy-
ment can be viewed as an incentive for adoption: a domain
has to report on its performance in order to prevent its neigh-
bors from blaming their problems on it undetected.
6. IMPLEMENTATION
Hardware Implementation. We now outline one possi-
ble implementation of Network Confessional that requires
an SRAM buffer and a small TCAM (ternary content ad-
dressable memory) chip per linecard. TCAM is already widely
used in routers for storing forwarding and filtering tables, in
general, any state that needs to be accessed at line rate. It
is appropriate for such applications, because it can access
in parallel all the entries of a stored table and return any
matches within a few nanoseconds, independently of the ta-
ble’s size.
Each node uses two circular buffers per linecard: one for
marker packets, stored in TCAM, and one for non-marker
packets, stored in SRAM. Upon receiving a packet p, the
node determines whether p is a marker packet, creates for it
a 〈PathID , PacketID , Time〉 tuple, and adds it to the head
of the marker or non-marker buffer, accordingly. In paral-
lel, a separate process reads tuples from the tail of the non-
marker buffer and determines whether each tuple Tp should
be kept or discarded, as follows. First, it reads Tp.PathID
and Tp.Time , and identifies the corresponding marker tuple:
it uses the TCAM search capabilities to identify all tuples T ′
in the marker buffer with T ′.PathID = Tp.PathID , deletes
any tuple with T ′.Time < Tp.Time from the marker buffer,
and chooses the marker tuple T with the smallest times-
tamp that also satisfies T.Time > Tp.Time. Then, if Hash
(T.PacketID , Tp.PacketID) < σ, it copies Tp elsewhere
for later dissemination, otherwise, it discards Tp.
The feasibility and cost of this implementation are de-
termined by the sizes of the two buffers. The non-marker
buffer must have size β  M
0.001µ
(Section 4.1). The marker
buffer must have size significantly larger than µ
M
β, so that
the probability of an overflow (i.e., that a marker tuple is
deleted before it is used) is negligible. For instance, for
µ
M
= 0.01, we need a non-marker buffer that can store
around 1 million tuples and a marker buffer that can store
around 0.1 million tuples; assuming 10 bytes per tuple, the
resources we need per linecard are: 10 MB of SRAM and a
TCAM chip of 1 MB with the ability to store 10 bytes per
entry, which is readily available today.
Receipt Overhead. Each router that supports Network
Confessional must periodically extract the sampled state from
its data-path and export it in the form of receipts, akin to
how a NetFlow-enabled router periodically extracts NetFlow
records from its data-path and exports them to a management
server for processing. The amount of memory, processing,
and bandwidth required for this operation is directly propor-
tional to the rate at which the router produces receipts, i.e.,
its sampling rate. This can be locally tuned to match the
router’s resources by changing the sampling threshold σ.
We have said that each domain makes each receipt avail-
able to every other domain that observed the corresponding
traffic. Whether this happens pro-actively (through a con-
stant receipt stream) or on-demand (e.g., through a secure
web interface), receipt dissemination introduces, in each path,
bandwidth overhead that depends on (1) the number of bor-
der routers on that path and (2) the rate at which each of
these routers produces receipts. This may seem, at first,
to be cause for concern—one could argue that introducing
bandwidth overhead that grows with the total number of bor-
der routers per path is not a scalable approach. In practice,
this is not a problem: Paths consist on average of 3–4 do-
mains (hence 4–6 border routers), while most paths consist
of fewer than 6 domains (10 border routers) [3]. Consider a
6-domain path, where each border router samples 1% of the
path’s packets. Assuming 20 bytes per receipt, this path will
incur an overhead of 2 bytes per packet; assuming 400 bytes
per packet, this leads to a 0.5% bandwidth overhead.
Software Implementation. As a proof of concept, we
implemented Alg. 1 in Click, configured an eight-core Intel
Nehalem server as a standard IPv4 router, and fed to it a real
trace. Then we measured the router’s performance with and
without running Alg. 1 and saw no difference (in both cases,
the server routed 25 Gbps). This is not surprising, given that,
when fed realistic traffic, a Nehalem server is bottlenecked
at the I/O [10], whereas our algorithm burdens the CPU.
In our implementation, we computed the PathID of each
packet as the concatenation of its source and destination ori-
gin prefixes. We implemented the MarkerID and PacketID
functions using the “Bob” hash function with different seeds,
because it has been shown to work well with Internet traf-
fic [20]. Given that the CAIDA traces do not include the full
payload of the captured packets, we applied the two func-
tions only to the IP header (modulo the TTL field) and the
small portion of the payload that is included—typically 20
bytes of TCP headers. Our results show that this is suffi-
cient, i.e., our implementation indeed collects a random sam-
ple from each path, with the sampling rate given by Eq. 1.
7. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The key properties of Network Confessional that differ-
entiate it from previous work are its bias-resistance, which
is guaranteed by the fact that domains cannot guess future
traffic, and tunability, which is guaranteed by the fact that
domains mostly sample non-overlapping packet sets (Sec-
tion 4). The key challenge was designing an implementation
that did not require per-packet, per-flow, or per-path state,
and showing that it can be realized with existing hardware
and reasonable overhead (Section 6). Beyond these prop-
erties, Network Confessional is a random sampling mech-
anism: it measures the loss and delay incurred by a ran-
dom subset of each domain’s traffic and estimates the loss
and delay incurred by the rest. Hence, the results we show
in this section—that Network Confessional accurately es-
timates domain performance—will not come as a surprise.
But that is precisely the point of this work: once we can effi-
ciently implement bias-resistant, tunable sampling, measur-
ing domain performance is straightforward, and we already
know how to do it accurately.
We would like to explain why we do not compare Network
Confessional to network tomography. One could argue that
tomography is a natural candidate for comparison, since it
enables end systems to estimate ISP performance. However,
tomography was designed to work in scenarios where net-
work nodes treat observed traffic independently from which
path it belongs to and conditions in subsequent network links
are uncorrelated. Network Confessional does not need these
assumptions (this is why, unlike tomography, it requires sup-
port from the network). Hence, we could easily show sim-
ulation results where Network Confessional outperforms to-
mography by considering scenarios where domains selec-
tively drop, delay, or throttle traffic from certain paths and/or
the failures/congestion of subsequent links are correlated.
We did not deem this to be either fair (to tomography) or
interesting.
Methodology. Suppose we use Network Confessional to
estimate the loss and delay performance of domain X from
Fig. 1. Our goal is to compare these estimates to X’s actual
loss and delay performance under different traffic scenarios.
Each experiment we present consisted of the following steps:
(1) we took an actual packet trace and assumed that it corre-
sponds to the traffic observed at node 4; (2) created a second,
modified trace, by introducing loss, delay, and reordering in
the first one, and assumed that it corresponds to the traffic
observed at node 5; (3) generated the receipts that nodes 4
and 5 would generate if they observed the respective traffic;
(4) estimated X’s performance from its receipts as described
in Section 4.3 and compared the estimates to X’s actual per-
formance.
For step 1, we used packet traces provided by CAIDA,
collected in 2008 and 2009 from a Tier-1 ISP. For step 3 (i.e.,
to generate the receipts), we used our Click implementation
(Section 6). For step 2, we introduced loss by discarding a
subset of the packets from the original trace, assuming ei-
ther uniform loss or the Gilbert-Elliot loss model [1] (the
results were the same). Introducing delay was more com-
plicated, as we are not aware of any commonly acceptable
delay model for Internet traffic. Instead, we used the NS2
simulator to create two realistic congestion scenarios, and
generated the sequence of delay values that a packet stream
would encounter in each case. In both scenarios, nodes 4
and 5 were connected through a congested 10 Gbps intra-
domain path with a minimum latency of 50 msec. In the
first scenario, our packet stream competed with an aggres-
sive UDP flow that saturated the path; in the second one, it
competed with hundreds of long-lived TCP flows.
Moreover, we wanted to introduce a certain amount of
packet reordering. For this, we looked at the latest pub-
lished reordering experiment that we could find, in which
the authors sent packet streams of different rates along dif-
ferent Internet paths and measured the amount and type of
reordering that occurred along each path as a function of
the packet rate [12]. From the reported results, we chose
those corresponding to the packet stream that incurred the
largest amount of reordering—the one labeled F600(UDP,
DC→LA, 1500) in [12]—to generate a reordering profile. In
our experiments, this reordering profile caused about 0.5%
of the packets that would have been sampled at some node to
be reordered with a marker and not be sampled. The results
reported in this section were derived by using this profile.
Before delving into performance evaluation, we performed
a simple sanity check: we ran our implementation of Alg. 1
over several packet traces for different values of β, µ and
σ, and verified that the resulting sampling rate for any given
path follows Eq. 1. Once that was verified, we fixed β to
1 million and µ
M
to 0.01 (i.e., chose 1% of the packets as
markers) and varied only σ
S
to change the sampling rate.
Loss Performance. Suppose that, for some period of
time, domain X introduces loss rate λ into a given path.
The question is, how accurately can we estimate λ? The
answer depends on the number of samples used for the es-
timate, as well as the loss rate itself (Section 4.3). For in-
stance, suppose that we want to estimate λ with a relative
standard deviation of 0.1. Eq. 2 tells us that, if λ = 1%
and pir = 0.5%, then we should compute our estimate after
collecting receipts for 19 850 packets; however, if λ = 25%
(and pir remains the same), then we only need receipts for
315 packets. To see what happens in practice, we looked
at different traces and different paths from them, introduced
different amounts of loss into each path, and estimated this
loss as a receipt collector would.
Loss (%) # Samples Time (seconds)
theoretical actual theoretical actual
1 19 850 13 200 66.17 44.00
5 2300 2000 7.67 6.67
10 1000 815 3.34 2.72
15 600 760 2.00 2.54
25 315 330 1.05 1.10
Table 3: Samples and time needed to estimate loss with a
relative standard deviation of 0.1.
Table 3 shows results for a representative path. The first
column specifies the loss rate λ. The second column shows
how many samples we need according to Eq. 2, in order to
estimate this loss rate with a relative standard deviation of
0.1. The third column shows how many samples we needed
in practice in order to achieve this accuracy (e.g., for λ =
1%, we had to collect 13 200 samples in order to reach a rela-
tive standard deviation of 0.1). The fourth and fifth columns
show how much time it would take to collect the respec-
tive number of samples given a path of 30 000 packets/sec
(roughly 100 Mbps, assuming 400 bytes/packet) and a sam-
pling rate of 1%. Consistently with the theory, the lower the
loss rate that we tried to estimate, the larger the number of
samples that we needed in order to estimate it accurately.
However, even a loss rate of 1% was accurately estimated in
less than 1 minute.
Delay Performance. Now suppose that we are trying to
estimate X’s delay distribution with respect to a given path,
over a certain period of time. As described in Section 4.3,
we use the technique from [22], which gives us an upper and
a lower bound for the delay distribution, which hold with
probability pi. We ask two questions: how far are these upper
and lower bounds from each other in different congestion
scenarios, i.e., with what granularity can we estimate the
delay distribution? and how does this granularity change in
the face of loss?
Again, the answer to the first question depends on the
number of samples used for the estimation. We computed
the upper and lower bounds for different paths and our
aggressive-UDP-flow and competing-TCP-flows congestion
scenarios, after collecting receipts for 1200 packets from
each path (given a path of 30 000 packets/sec and a sampling
rate of 1%, 1200 sampled packets correspond to T = 4 sec).
In all cases, the bounds stayed within one or two millisec-
onds from one another. Of course, the credit for this result
goes to the authors of [22], who devised the technique for
obtaining the bounds. Still, we mention this result, to make
the point that their technique matches well our goal of accu-
rately estimating the delay performance of network domains
in the presence of severe congestion (which is when they
would mostly want to hide it).
The second question is more relevant to our contribution.
Intuitively, the more loss we have between nodes 4 and 5,
the fewer the packets that are commonly sampled by the
two nodes over the given time period, hence, the worse the
granularity with which we can estimate X’s delay distribu-
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Figure 2: Granularity with which we can estimate the
90th quantile with confidence 90%.
tion. Fig. 2 focuses on the 90th delay quantile and shows
how the granularity with which we can estimate that quan-
tile with probability pi = 90% changes as a function of loss.
We see that, in the aggressive-UDP-flow scenario, loss rate
does affect granularity, but not to a practically significant
extent—introducing 50% loss decreases granularity barely
by 1 msec.
8. RELATED WORK
The idea of delayed disclosure of a secret—the sampling
seed—has appeared before in networked systems. In the
closest related work (which was developed in parallel with
our own) Zhang et al. [23] describe a taxonomy of schemes
that enable a trusted source/destination pair to identify on-
path network adversaries that are maliciously dropping pack-
ets. In one of these schemes (PAAI-1), delayed disclosure
comes in the form of an explicit request from the source to
all the nodes on the path identifying a packet that should
be acknowledged. First, that work targets a stronger adver-
sarial model (adversaries who may modify or inject pack-
ets) but relies on stronger assumptions as well: symmetric
traffic paths and application-layer processing of all receipts
by all nodes on a path (onion cryptography). In contrast,
Network Confessional makes no claim about the path tra-
versed by receipts to collectors and requires processing only
by the issuer of a receipt. Second, PAAI-1 requires that
the source generates explicit signaling in addition to nor-
mal traffic and that all nodes implement fine-granularity, per-
packet timers. In contrast, Network Confessional requires no
explicit signaling—using instead later traffic to derive late-
disclosed secrets—and a common circular buffer per node
without any associated timers. At a higher level, the work
by Zhang et al. concerns a usage model that requires end
points (e.g., the source and the destination) to be intimately
involved implementing functionality such as end-to-end re-
ceipts, whereas our approach could be implemented locally,
only within a short sub-path of an end-to-end path; and all
domains must participate equally to the monitoring scheme,
whereas local tunability is an explicit, fundamental require-
ment of Network Confessional.
The Packet Obituaries protocol [6] and the fault-localization
protocols from [13] inform traffic sources where individual
packets get lost or corrupted. AudIt provides source do-
mains with similar per-TCP-flow information [7]. Network
Confessional is similar to these protocols in that it relies on
in-path elements collecting and exporting traffic statistics;
it also borrows the concept of report consistency from Au-
dIt. However, unlike these protocols, Network Confessional
avoids the overheads necessary for collecting and propagat-
ing per-packet or per-flow state, while maintaining the veri-
fiability property.
In Trajectory Sampling, routers within an ISP sample pack-
ets using a hash function and record their digests, with the
purpose of inferring the internal paths (sequences of routers)
followed by packets [11]. The Lossy Difference Aggregator
enables two monitoring points to measure the loss and aver-
age delay between them by maintaining packet counts and
average timestamps for packet aggregates [17]. The “Secure
Sketch” technique from [14] enables Alice and Bob to detect
when the packets they exchange are lost, delayed, or modi-
fied beyond a certain level. All three protocols are relevant
to our work, in the sense that they measure network perfor-
mance, but, as explained in Section 3, none of them could
provide the properties necessary in our context.
Finally, Network Confessional can be viewed as a “per-
formance accountability mechanism,” which holds domains
accountable for their performance. An economic analysis
has showed that such a performance accountability mecha-
nism would foster ISP competition and innovation [18].
9. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented Network Confessional, a system by
which network domains can estimate and verify each other’s
loss and delay performance. Network Confessional relies on
domains producing and exchanging receipts for the traffic
they receive and deliver. A domain can estimate a neigh-
bor’s performance by processing the receipts produced by
the neighbor; it can verify that the neighbor’s receipts are
honest by comparing them to the receipts produced by other
domains for the same traffic. If a domain lies about its per-
formance, that leads to receipt inconsistencies and exposes
the liar to its neighbors. Network Confessional comes at
the cost of deploying (modest) new functionality at domain
boundaries. The processing, memory, and bandwidth over-
head incurred by a deploying domain is configurable and in-
dependently determined by the domain.
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